How the Humean mosaic view of the world and the natural laws is straightforward
Norman Swartz (1997) provides a list of the characteristics that the laws of nature could have in the RVL account to highlight how big a problem this is. Swartz outlines five requirements for natural laws, outlining the characteristics that establish laws apart from assertions of fact. The seriousness of the problem is demonstrated by the fact that, despite all the conditions of the laws of nature given, Swartz's list still only yields minimal regularity. A rule of nature, in Swartz's opinion, represents a factual truth (not a logical one), is true for all of time and space, lacks proper names, makes general or statistical statements, and lastly makes a conditional claim rather than a categorical one (Swartz and Carroll, 1997).
The rules of nature are described as regular objects in the cosmos under these five conditions. A law of nature must be contingent, as stated in condition (1). (not necessary, as discussed). The rules of nature must be applicable everywhere, according to condition (2). (i.e., there obviously cannot be laws that hold only in London, for instance). In accordance with condition (3), laws must not use any proper names; in other words, they must never refer to particular instantiations. The requirement that laws be quantifiable is the fourth requirement. A law of nature must make a conditional claim, according to condition (5). Therefore, a natural rule cannot state categorically that "there are clouds." The main takeaway from Swartz's list is that a law of nature cannot just be a statement about the universe. This doesn't appear to matter, even so. Nothing more than basic regularity is produced by the five aforementioned requirements. Laws may very well be consistent and have the aforementioned qualities (or "conditions"). It may also be true that we frequently observe natural rules in action and in instances of causation, but this shouldn't imply that the laws of nature are merely routines. If causality is described by regular rules of nature, which are only regularities in and of themselves, then this does not account for it. Regularity can't always provide us the solution.
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